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Abstract: This paper reviews the behaviour of multinational companies across global value 
chains. The production and exchange of a final or intermediate product is no longer limited 
to a simple transaction in nation-state. There are at least five forms of global value chains 
(market; captive; hierarchical and relational). These new business models minimized the 
marginal cost of production for many multinational companies. However, with the pressure 
of a hyper-competitive global production regime and its iron triangle (price, quality, and 
flexibility), the different transactions were often accompanying by inadequate labor 
conditions across the intermediate links. Thus, the traditional regime of labor regulation 
has given way to new coercive and normative mechanisms often labelled under corporate 
social responsibility initiatives. Based on a literature search, this article is written from a 
critical perspective and advances a new theoretical approach. The behaviour of a 
multinational company varies according to the nature of institutional arrangements in its 
home country. Our approach is based on the French theory of regulation and the American 
theory of strategic choice. Our analysis shows that labor regulation instruments seem 
increasingly decentralized in countries with family capitalism and countries with social-
democratic capitalism. However, they frequently centralized in countries with a capitalism 
dominated by markets and finance. This new cartography makes an interpretative break 
with previous developments that do not consider the institutional context in the analysis of 
the form of governance of global value chains.  
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1. Introduction  
Global Value Chains (GVCs) become a feature of the 21st century economy. The 
manufacture or supply of a final or intermediate product appears increasingly dispersed 
around the world. Most branded products have retained only the name of their native 
country. Emerging from the 1990s in academic research, the concept of GVC refers to all 
the activities necessary for a product or service through the different stages of production, 
from design to final consumption. According to Barrientos et al. (2016), in 2013, 80% of 
international trade pass through GVCs. These production and service structures employ 
more than 453 million workers in 40 OECD and emerging countries.  
Participation in GVCs requires that criteria relating to price, time, flexibility, and product 
quality standards be met (Weil, 2014). However, bringing these criteria and product image 
concerns up to minimum employment standards seems very difficult for many companies, 
especially those involved in the intermediate links and interfaces (Weil, 2014; Cairola, 
2015). To respond to stakeholder pressure, some companies, especially the lead company 
of the chain, have often sought to overcome their image deficit with Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) initiatives.  
GVC and CSR seem to be among the new concepts in the field of industrial relations. 
Recent empirical and theoretical developments confirm this observation (Lakhani et al., 
2013; Tapia et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the study of the conditions under which companies 
adopt CSR programmes and policies in the workplace is still underdeveloped. Therefore, 
we support the idea that the fragmentation of production challenges the traditional labor 
regulation regime anchored in traditional coercion mechanisms (State, unions and labor 
laws). 
In order with recent developments on new employment relationships and the differential 
influence of new research themes, this article is divided in five sections. In the second 
section, we present the focus of the research. We also discuss our conceptual framework. 
It is interesting to explain the origins and fundamentals of CSR and GVCs. There is too 
much confusion between the two concepts. In the third section, we develop our analytical 
framework. Our reference framework is based on the French theory of regulation and the 
American theory of strategic choice. In the fourth section, we present our research 
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methodology and the results of our analysis. We expose three initiatives of CSR. They have 
enabled us to decipher the contributions and limitations of CSR through GVCs. The last 
section concludes. Our results not only contribute to the recent literature on the nature of 
the linkage between GVCs and CSR but can also inspire actors in the world of labor and 
business on the best strategies for economic integration. 
2. Focus of the research 
CSR has recently recognized in the world of business as a trade-off between financial and 
social performance (Orlitzky et al., 2001). Several multidisciplinary works point to Howard 
Bowen’s book (Social Responsibilities of the Businessman, 1953) as one of the first 
academic references that explicitly addresses the concept of CSR. According to Acquier 
and Gond (2007), it is interesting to note that Howard Bowen’s (1953) ideas are on a 
continuum with early American institutionalists such as Wesley Mitchell and John Rogers 
Commons. Indeed, Howard Bowen’s (1953) hypotheses structured the set of approaches 
that emerged in relation to CSR.  
The conception of CSR has better developed from a managerial perspective with Edward 
Freeman (1984) in stakeholder model. This model has become a reference in the academic 
literature on CSR. Stakeholders are defined as any person or group of persons who are 
influenced and/or who directly and indirectly influence the behaviour of the company. 
However, work on CSR has been widely contested, particularly by the most liberal wing 
of capitalism. More explicitly, for Milton Friedman (1962), "if the free market cannot solve 
social problems, it falls not upon business, but upon government and legislation to do the 
job" (in Carroll and Shabana, 2010, p. 88). 
Several theoretical and empirical developments are advanced to decipher this controversy. 
However, the definition and scope of this phenomenon has not been unanimously agreed. 
Alexander Dahlsrud, a noted contributor to the CSR literature, highlights 37 definitions of 
CSR, drawn from only 27 references (scientific journal articles and web pages) between 
1980 and 2003. More specifically, he advances CSR as "a social construction in a specific 
context" (Dahlsrud, 2006, p. 2). Of the 27 selected references, the most cited definition is 
the report by the Commission of the European Communities (2001) : CSR is "a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
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operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis" (Alexander 
Dahlsrud, 2006, p. 7). It is interesting to note that in other definitions, the unitary 
perspective prevails, as do the different conceptions, with too much controversy as to 
whether to take account of labor relations.  
An integral definition of CSR is reported to Bodet and Lamarche (2007, p. 4). CSR is "an 
attempt on the part of companies to show their capacity to produce the rules governing 
their actions". According to Bair and Palpacuer (2015, p. 3), these rules can generate the 
consent of "various groups stakeholders, including NGOs, labor unions and local 
community groups". In addition to the analysis in terms of vertically integrated companies 
within a nation-state, recent research has attempted to renew the scope and dimensions of 
CSR with the integration of GVCs (Lakhani et al., 2013; Tapia et al., 2015). It is interesting 
to note that we will limit our level of analysis to CSR and industrial relations duels not at 
the level of a single company, but at the level of GVCs under the hypothesis that companies 
are less vertically integrated and CSR practices differ from one socio-economic context to 
another. Before moving on to the development of our hypothesis, it seems interesting to 
define the GVCs.   
2.1. Conceptual framework 
Despite recent theoretical and empirical efforts, there is no uniform definition of GVCs. 
The conceptualization of the spatial disintegration of production and the integration of 
international trade is a multidisciplinary field of research. A coherent approach across 
GVCs was often linked, as early as 1994, to the work of Garry Gereffi and his colleagues 
with the concept of the "global commodity chains" (Cairola, 2015). However, initial 
approaches emerged particularly about regional trade, the theory of comparative advantage 
(Ricardo, 1817), the French "Filière" approach (1970) and finally the GVCs approach of 
Gereffi et al. (2005). 
The division of production processes has a long history. In a pre-capitalist era, this mode 
of transaction was integrated under the concept of regional trade with the Phoenicians 
(Weil, 2014). These economic transactions describe an exchange of products and raw 
materials between the various ports of the Mediterranean. Subsequently, trade and 
exchange between nations developed further to reach the four corners of the planet. One of 
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the first conceptualizations of this process is the theory of comparative advantage (in 
Azarhoushang et al., 2015, p. 155). David Ricardo (1817), under the hypothesis of "capital 
and labour immobility and full employment", proves that by participating in the exchange 
"both countries benefit from the international division of labor in the form of increasing 
output and consumption". This view was repeatedly challenged, particularly with 
technological change, the spatial disintegration of production and the new international 
division of labor. Moreover, with a domination of the managerial perspective, decisions 
are increasingly made in terms of transaction costs. Indeed, it is no longer a simple 
transaction of a final product.  
A recent development in relation to GVCs is the "Filière" approach. French economists 
developed the basic concept in the 1970s with a spatial analysis of production. The Filière 
is "a system of agents producing and distributing goods and services for the satisfaction of 
a final demand" (Henderson et al., 2002, p. 439). The objective of this approach is the 
simple design of production and distribution structures of vertically integrated companies 
on an international scale. However, this approach does not consider the new structures of 
spatial disintegration of production and the wide range of concerned actors.  
A better theoretical concept was related to global production networks developed by 
Henderson et al. (2002). A priori, Dieter Ernst creates this approach in the 1960s. Starting 
from the limits of his level of analysis, Henderson et al. (2002) integrate all the actors that 
influence economic and social outcomes: companies, governments, unions, and NGOs. 
Indeed, these researchers conceptualize the interrelationships among these actors, network 
structures, the institutional fabric, and the flows of capital and labor. In addition, Henderson 
et al. (2002) reveal three dimensions that influence global production networks: the 
creation and distribution of value, the power, and the social and institutional integration of 
the network. Power seems to be a key element in this analysis. Indeed, three forms of 
power1 are raised, at the level of the company, institutions, and collective actors. A 
somewhat special contribution in relation to the other GVC developments is the emphasis 
placed on institutions. However, this approach is widely criticized. For example, Lakhani 
et al. (2013, p. 445) show that this analytical framework is "too inclusive and all 
encompassing". Also, there is too much confusion about the concepts of production 
networks and value chains.  
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One theoretical concept that has attracted more interest in the academic literature is related 
to global commodity chains developed by Gereffi and colleagues (1994; 1995; 1999). It 
can be defined as an inter-organizational network grouped around a product, linking 
households, companies, and states to the global economy (Gereffi et al., 1994). It is 
interesting to note that the lead company plays a central role. It constitutes, coordinates, 
and controls the chain, with a distinction between a Buyer-driven global commodity chains 
and a Producer-driven global commodity chains. Following the framework of Riisgaard 
and Hammer (2011) and Azarhoushang et al. (2015) and some examples from our literature 
review the distinction between the two global commodity chains can be summarized in the 
table below (Table 1).  
The main characteristics can relatively explain the spatial disintegration of production and 
the integration of international trade. For buyer-governed chains, Brown (2015, p. 37) work 
shows that none of the workers are directly employed by the brand. Suppliers, 
subcontractors, or labour agencies employ them. In the case of producer-controlled chains, 
they have a higher level of coordination and the lead company closely monitors the 
organization of labor and production. 
Table 1 The two global commodity chains 
 Buyer-driven global commodity chains Producer-driven global commodity chains 
Chain Governor Retailer or branded company: 
"Producers without Factory"  
Classic MNC 
 
Nature of 
control 
Pricing, product design and 
development and marketing (core 
competencies with high value added) 
Total (subsidiaries) or partial (franchising, 
licensing, or international subcontracting) 
ownership of production units  
Incentive Competitive advantage  
 
Protecting patents and technologies; 
Access to local markets or natural 
resources 
Suppliers Relative independence: manufacturing 
and/or assembly   
Dependence: direct control of technology 
and assembly lines of the final product 
Type of industry  High labor-intensive  High capital-intensive 
Example Agricultural products; Apparel industry Automobile industry; Electronics industry 
Source: Author own elaboration based on Riisgaard and Hammer (2011) and Azarhoushang et al. (2015). 
This approach was criticized by Gereffi et al. (2005). Subsequent research shows that there 
are other modes of coordination at the level of some companies. Indeed, Gereffi and his 
colleagues put forward the concept of Global Value Chains (GVCs). The new concept 
integrates the asset specificity of Williamson (1975). Moreover, for Gereffi et al. (2005), 
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transaction costs go beyond the binary vision: buyer-producer. These costs can be 
interpreted as the result of linked production. Indeed, they depend on complexity of 
transactions (information exchanged to specify products and processes and to maintain a 
particular transaction), codification of information (standards or tacit knowledge to 
minimize transaction costs), and supplier capacity (to meet the requirements of the 
transaction). Lakhani et al. (2013, pp. 444-45) reveal that "the higher the complexity of 
task requirements, the lower the codifiability of the said requirements, and the lower the 
capabilities of supplier, the more likely that lead firms will choose value chain 
configurations that ensure high levels of explicit coordination and power asymmetry".  
Table 2 Main characteristics of five GVCs 
 Market  Modular  Relational  Captive  Hierarchical  
Supplier Offers simple 
products at a fixed 
price. Production 
does not require 
special skills. 
Offers specific 
products; Has 
technical and 
commercial 
qualities for 
different 
customers 
Complementarity 
between lead 
company and 
supplier: 
manufacturing 
and distribution. 
Small 
suppliers 
against a 
powerful lead 
company 
Intra and inter-
company trade: 
Foreign Direct 
Investment or 
offshore. The lead 
company coordinates 
all activities 
Transaction 
complexity 
Simple price signals: 
low information 
complexity and low 
explicit 
coordination 
Complex 
information 
with low explicit 
coordination 
Frequent 
interaction and 
high explicit 
coordination  
Unidirectional 
information 
flows 
Unidirectional 
information flows 
Codification Simple product 
specifications 
Highly 
formalised 
specifications 
High coordination 
and low 
codification 
Detailed 
instructions 
Low: tasks often 
essential for 
competitive 
advantage 
Supplier 
capacity 
Little input from 
buyers 
Capacity and 
autonomy 
High Low  The lead company 
directly manufactures 
its products 
Dependence Independence: 
contractual 
relationship 
Independence: 
"turnkey"  
Interdependence Dependence Links between 
subsidiaries 
Power Balance: low costs 
of switching to new 
suppliers 
Complex power 
relations: an 
oligopolistic 
producer 
market with 
many buyers 
A delicate power 
balance: 
partnership, trust, 
and high explicit 
coordination 
Power 
asymmetry: 
weak 
bargaining 
position  
Vertical power 
relations 
Control Little interaction: 
relatively unstable 
GVC and little 
coordination  
Low control: 
provider 
assumes full 
responsibility 
Control and trust: 
"contracted 
instead of 
penalties" 
High degree 
of oversight: 
one-way 
control 
Management control: 
"from managers to 
subordinates, or from 
headquarters to 
subsidiaries" 
Governance Traditional-
Economic 
Network Network Network Traditional-Economic 
Source: Author own elaboration based on Gereffi et al. (2005) and Lakhani et al. (2013). 
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Following the framework of Sturgeon (2002), the three variables mentioned and the two 
classical dualities (buyer-producer), Gereffi et al. (2005) identify five forms of governance. 
They range from low to high levels of explicit coordination and power asymmetry. In 
addition, these types of governance can range from market, where companies are relatively 
independent, to vertically integrated companies. Based on the analyses of Gereffi et al. 
(2005) and Lakhani et al. (2013), the main characteristics of the five GVCs can be 
regrouped in table 2. 
The market and the hierarchical GVCs refer to simple transactions. The other three are 
governed by explicit coordination with a difference between networks. However, this 
theoretical model is limited to two actors, the lead company, and the suppliers. Moreover, 
this model is very limited at the empirical level. A German study (Birner, 2015) on the 
GVC of the American company Amazon has shown the existence of at least four forms of 
governance of its GVC (market; captive; hierarchical and relational). In addition, Lakhani 
et al. (2013, p. 445) criticize the weak focus on the workplace and institutional context. 
Thus, this development seems "overly narrow and static". 
All the above suggests that the literature on GVCs is too variable to draw generalizable 
conclusions. In addition, there is no consensus on the use of a term. From our literature 
review, it appears that several researchers use the concepts of supply chains, value chains, 
global product chains, global production networks and GVCs in a substitutable manner 
(e.g., Bair and Palpaucuer, 2015). These concepts have a large area of convergence. 
However, the terminological emphasis differs slightly. We argue throughout this paper that 
etymologically and practically the concept of GVC2 is the most appropriate, at least, for 
our research object. 
3. Theoretical frameworks  
Gereffi et al. (2005) is used as a reference in recent research on GVCs. However, they 
downplay the role of collective actors and institutions3. Similarly, one of the research 
perspectives highlighted by Henderson et al. (2002, p. 457), and which remains 
underdeveloped in recent research, is to consider the different of national capitalisms. Thus, 
drawing on the American theory of strategic choice and the French theory of regulation, 
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we try to establish a more adequate analytical framework that can explain the nature of the 
relationship between CSR and GVC. 
3.1. Theory of strategic choice 
Some researchers in industrial relations, drawing on the model developed by Kochan and 
his colleagues (1984; 1986), place CSR in a strategic vision of companies seeking to 
undermine traditional regulatory mechanisms (Tapia et al., 2015). As a result, the theory 
of strategic choice appears a priori to be a starting point for analysing the outsourcing of 
labor relations. On the other hand, a point that has not, in fact, merited much attention in 
the analyses of the theory of strategic choice is related to "Leave", as emphasized in the 
conceptual scheme of Kochan et al. (1984, p. 25). We can understand from this model that 
the spatial disintegration of production is implicitly emphasized: with a change in the 
product market, (1) the company must re-evaluate its position (2) and decide whether to 
stay or quit (3). By staying, the company is obliged to reorganise its capital (4). Each 
decision involves specific organizational and commercial choices (5; 6). As a result, 
offshoring is among the new management choices. Indeed, Kochan et al. (1984) discuss 
the new organization of production known today as GVC. According to the analysis of 
Gereffi et al. (1994), it appears to be more Producer-driven global commodity chains. 
The model is well suited to analyse the various changes in the industrial relations systems 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. This Framework attempts to show that industrial relations 
systems are not only related to the workplace. The top of the managerial pyramid and the 
organizational and institutional environments can also shape them. Indeed, the functionalist 
perspective takes precedence over the systemic view developed in Dunlop’s (1958) model. 
Kochan et al. (1986, p. 11) try to value the influence of " the environment, values, business 
strategies, institutional structures, and [the history of employment relations, in the 
company, in the industrial relations processes and in the results of the industrial relations 
system]". Concerning the workplace, Kochan et al. (1986, p. 147) explain several strategies 
to address the regulatory deficit caused by the decline of unionism. Thus, Tapia et al. (2015) 
postulate that CSR in Anglo-Saxon countries is more aligned with the new reality of 
employment relations and can be inscribed in a perspective of strategic choices. CSR is 
replacing traditional regulatory mechanisms. In most cases, it is independent of the State 
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and of public policies, whether of the host country or of the country of origin of 
multinational companies (MNCs). On the other hand, in Western European countries, the 
institutional context influences the strategic choice of management. CSR initiatives are 
generally advanced implicitly and in complementarity with traditional enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Despite the theoretical and empirical contributions, the theory of strategic choice is not 
without criticism. It is limited to the three traditional actors of the industrial relations 
systems. It also remains linked to the three levels of analysis of the industrial relations 
systems (workshop; company; nation-state). Thus, Briand and Bellemare (2015, pp. 22/31) 
explain that several actors can influence "institutions, structures, rules and practices" of the 
industrial relations systems. These new actors can be considered as a "fourth level of 
industrial relations regulation". There is also a multiplicity of new actors that can directly 
and indirectly strengthen regulatory mechanisms, such as regional and international trade 
union federations, civil society organizations and international labor NGOs (Tapia et al., 
2015). These new actors contribute to new non-traditional regulatory mechanisms, such as 
International Framework Agreements (IFAs) and codes of conduct (Josserand and Kaine, 
2016). In sum, by relying on regulation theory, we try to find a more adequate theoretical 
approach with the new reality of industrial relations.  
3.2. Theory of regulation  
Proponents of this theory argue that the institutional context influences the actions of 
companies in terms of the competitive strategies. Advanced theory seeks to better 
understand the governance structures used to coordinate and manage the complexity of 
relationships inside and outside companies (Boyer, 2015, p. 211). This conception may 
lead us to analyse the impact of CSR through GVCs. 
In terms of space-time, the fundamental social relations of production in each society and 
at a given time are the result of a historical process4. Indeed, institutional forms correspond 
to the "codification of one or more fundamental social relations" (idem, p. 47). Regulation 
theory identifies five institutional forms: the wage labor nexus, the monetary regime, the 
forms of competition, the links between State and the economy, and the insertion of 
domestic economy into the international relations. They are the result of an 
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institutionalized compromise and they constitute an institutional configuration. The wage 
labor nexus is a fundamental concept. Known by its synthetic nature, it encompasses five 
components, which refer to an organizational dimension and an institutional dimension5. 
The wage labor nexus is the configuration of three relationships: the labor/capital 
relationship, the market relationship, and the power relationship (idem, p. 121). Given the 
field of industrial relations also focuses on job quality and labor conditions, an analysis of 
the wage labor nexus can capture the effects of CSR on minimum employment standards 
through GVCs.  
The interdependence of the five institutional forms is likely to influence the strategies 
employed by lead companies. According to Boyer (2015, p. 31), "a significant proportion 
of company choices are in reaction to, or in conformity with, the institutions of the set". 
This depends largely on the different types of institutional arrangements in different 
countries. Thus, Harada et Tohyama (2011, in Boyer, 2015, pp. 235-237) identifies seven 
ideal-types of the political economy of capitalism divided into two blocs: three capitalisms 
of old industrialized countries and four other Asian capitalisms. Apart from the second 
block, these are countries with a capitalism dominated by markets and finance, countries 
with a family capitalism, and countries with a social-democratic capitalism. Each form of 
capitalism creates different conditions under which companies choose their labor 
organizations and business strategies. Drawing on the analyses of Tapia et al. (2015) and 
Hadwiger (2015), we argue that CSR through GVC can be correlated with the type of 
capitalism at the level of the lead company’s main headquarters.  
It is difficult to study a theory without looking at its limitations. Jessop and Sum (2016) 
prove that this theory focuses on complementarity and institutional prioritization within an 
institutional configuration while neglecting contradictions. Moreover, the 
conceptualization of the wage labor nexus is subject to numerous controversies. Bodet and 
Lamarche (2016) support the idea that MNCs have instruments that do not operate on a 
microeconomic scale, but on a meso-scale. Indeed, despite the richness of this theory, the 
study of GVCs has not taken up much space in the Review of regulation6. In summary, we 
support the hypothesis that the emergence of a global labor governance regime is aligned 
with the actions of traditional and new actors of workplace. 
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3.3. General framework of analysis 
Based on the assumption that MNCs are less vertically integrated, we postulate that the 
outcome of the emerging global labor governance regime would be a regulatory framework 
negotiated between the traditional and the new concerned actors in the activities of MNCs. 
Despite the existence of similar structural changes in market economies, CSR initiatives 
across GVCs vary largely according to the form of capitalism dominated in the country 
where the main headquarters of the lead company is located. Thus, the strategic scope of 
MNCs can be conceptualized as an articulation between the strategic choice and the 
institutional arrangements in each country.  
According to Boyer (2015, pp. 244-245), the domination of finance over nation-states has 
weakened traditional coercive mechanisms. Indeed, economic, and financial liberalization 
has given rise to a new reconfiguration of the hierarchy of five institutional forms. These 
changes are largely influenced by the change in the competition regime. The monopolistic 
regime of the glorious thirty years is giving way to an oligopolistic and more internationally 
open competitive regime. In this context, CSR is put in place by lead company as a strategy 
for self-producing rules and for coping with international competition. Indeed, CSR seems 
to be part of a functionalist logic based on profit and the search for competitive advantage.  
International competition has influenced the power relationship between the traditional 
actors in industrial relations. The institutional form most affected is the wage labor nexus. 
This concept encompasses five components : "the type of means of production; form of the 
social and technical division of labor; modality of mobilization and attachment of 
employees to the company; determinants of wage income" (Boyer, 2015, p. 46). With the 
decline of the Fordism, all these components are affected, with low indexation of wages to 
inflation, the decentralization of collective bargaining and the outsourcing of labor 
relations.  
Moreover, strategic choices may influence the form of MNCs’ insertion to the international 
relations regime. The form of insertion of domestic economy into the international relations 
can be defined as "the conjunction of rules that organize relations between the nation-state 
and the rest of the world, both in terms of trade in goods and the location of production, 
through direct investment or the financing of external flows and balances" (Boyer, 2015, 
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p. 46). The form of insertion of domestic economy into the international relations plays an 
important role through international regulatory mechanisms. On the other hand, a 
company’s power may be limited by the legitimacy of its actions and the expectations of 
its stakeholders. Its actions may be in reaction to or in compliance with institutions that are 
not only national, but also international. Nevertheless, Boyer’s (2015, p. 117) analysis is 
limited to the four institutional arrangements: associations, communities/civil society, 
networks, and companies. Beyond local actors, international actors concerned with the 
world of labor (e.g., Social Accountability International, International Trade Union 
Federation) and intergovernmental (e.g., UN, ILO) and regional organizations (e.g., 
European Union) can influence the behaviour of MNC. The analysis of Henderson et al. 
(2002) is relevant to the development of these points. The three forms of power (MNC; 
institutions; collective actors) can be useful in analysing the interactions between actors. 
We postulate that these three forms of power may be key elements influencing the 
differential issue of CSR through GVCs. In sum, the nature of the distribution of power 
among stakeholders influences the decision of MNC in terms of insertion to international 
regulatory mechanisms. 
In addition, MNCs are the governors of several types of economic and extra-economic 
relationships. They occupy a central role of authority and domination in a complex web of 
relationships. According to Weil (2014), despite the spatial disintegration of production 
and increased integration with international trade, MNCs often remain the centre of gravity 
for the organization of labor and production of the various sub-units that orbit around them, 
both within and outside the nation-state. Thus, we assume that MNC constitute, coordinate, 
and control the organization of labor and production within and outside the nation-state. 
This business model varies among the five forms of GVCs (Table 2). The different 
governance relationships may change depending on the provider and the form of 
governance of the GVC. Despite their often dependence on suppliers, MNC have advanced 
CSR initiatives as an investment in their intangible capital. 
The result of a strategic field of action in terms of industrial relations is an intrinsic and 
extrinsic commitment of MNC through CSR initiatives. The first relates to cooperation 
with stakeholders while recognising the legitimacy of their role and expectations. 
Arbitration can be made in terms of costs/benefits. As a result, decent corporate behaviour 
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and less conflictual power relations can be a source of competitive advantage. The second 
commitment can be interpreted particularly from a legal perspective. Clauses in a code of 
conduct or IFA can be legally binding. They may put pressure on MNC to commit to 
compliance with the agreements entered. In sum, CSR is a new institution formalised in 
response to stakeholder pressures. It appears to be aligned with new regime of regulation 
of labor and employment relations.  
Such articulation between strategic choices and institutional arrangements is particularly 
relevant to social and organizational performance. The first relates to an improvement in 
employee compensation and job security. The second relates to better management in the 
workplace. The benchmark issue relates to minimum employment standards. In terms of 
the overall performance of the MNC, CSR through GVCs can be a source of competitive 
advantage. Investment in the intangible capital has become one of the major issues for 
major brands. This is quite remarkable on the websites of several MNCs classified in the 
Fortune Global 500 (2020). 
4. New employment relationships and industrial relations management systems  
In this section, we decode the influence of the internationalization of capital on the global 
governance of labor. Using a qualitative methodology, our review of recent literature aims 
to identify the most recent CSR initiatives through GVCs. These initiatives will serve as a 
guideline for our empirical work. First, we decode the employment system at suppliers and 
the role of lead companies. Next, we analyse the specificity of the three CSR initiatives 
and the role of new international actors. 
4.1. International suppliers: employment relationship system  
With the relocation of production activities of several companies, Wright and Kaine (2015) 
reveal that they are particularly interested in avoiding unions, obscuring accountability, 
and circumventing pay equity constraints. Many of these options are widely available in 
low-wage countries. However, the organizational structures developed by MNCs go 
beyond this simple analysis. Riisgaard and Hammer (2011, p. 170) argue that "GVCs need 
to be treated as an emerging phenomenon with it particular structures and power relations 
that constrain and enable strategies by collective labour in particular ways". Thus, a more 
advanced development of Lakhani et al. (2013) allowed us to identify the nature of labor 
 15 
 
relations between the different forms of governance of GVCs. The employment 
relationships in the workplace may change depending on the provider and the form of 
governance of the GVC. Drawing particularly on the development of Gereffi et al. (2005) 
and from an institutionalist perspective, Lakhani et al. (2013) distinguish between five 
ideal-types of labor relations. The table below summarizes the different characteristics with 
examples from our literature review (Table 3). 
Table 3 Labor relations and GVCs 
 Market Modular Relational Captive Hierarchical 
Employment 
system 
Autonomy and 
total control of 
suppliers 
Total control of 
suppliers with 
little or no input 
from the lead 
company 
Jointly influenced: 
lead company 
(e.g., training) and 
suppliers (high 
control over HRM) 
High influence 
of the lead 
company  
Management 
control 
Stability of the 
employment 
system 
Low stability 
(temporary, 
seasonal jobs)  
Moderately 
stable  
Very stable Low stability 
with Taylorism 
production  
Very stable 
with high job 
security 
Quality of 
employees 
Low-skilled: low 
value-added tasks 
Moderately 
skilled and 
polyvalent  
Highly skilled and 
competent 
Low-skilled Highly skilled 
Dominant 
institutions  
Host country Host country Host country and 
reflect the 
institutions of the 
country of the lead 
company 
Host country: 
weak local 
institutions 
Home 
country 
Example Agricultural 
products; Apparel 
industry 
US electronics 
industries 
Automobile 
industry; Software 
industry  
Food industries; 
Call centres 
Japanese ICT 
companies 
Source: Author own elaboration based on Gereffi et al. (2005) and Lakhani et al. (2013) 
The approach developed is supported by examples from industries that may be 
representative of different types of governance arrangements. According to Wright and 
Kaine (2015, p. 487), large MNCs directly employ workers in strategic positions through 
GVCs and outsource positions with generic skills. In addition to the role of the lead 
company, we can also add the nature of the employment subsystem control regime at the 
supplier. It can be influenced by State structures and the nature of labor control regimes 
(Anner, 2015). Table 3 shows at least one decent system of labor relations. This is the 
hierarchical GVC. All other forms of GVCs are often linked to inadequate labor conditions 
(Brown, 2015). They aim at making "flexible/mobile/global" production structures more 
dynamic (Cairola, 2015, p. 10).  
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In sum, our table is well aligned with our analytical framework and is consistent with the 
hypothesis that industrial relations are internationalizing by developing new actors and 
forms of governance. Despite the weak influence of lead companies in market or modular 
GVCs, stakeholder pressures have led them to intervene and influence the supplier 
employment system. Indeed, even with supplier independence, lead companies have 
advanced CSR initiatives.  
4.2. Code of conduct and knock-on effect  
The asymmetry of power within GVC and the divergent employment system among 
suppliers has often been accompanied by inadequate labor conditions. According to 
Mückenberger (2008), codes of conduct can be considered the first generation of CSR7. On 
the other hand, Hassel (2008, p. 232) considers codes of conduct a source of "positive 
externalities" throughout the GVC. He argues that "firms have accepted responsibility for 
the personnel policy of their suppliers in industrial relations" (idem, p. 231).  
Nevertheless, codes of conduct are in most cases independent of government and public 
policy, whether from the host country or the home country of the lead company. Indeed, 
Tapia et al. (2015) put codes of conduct in a unitary perspective. Indeed, according to 
Hassel (2008), out of 215 codes of conduct evaluated by the ILO in 1998, 80% are 
implemented unilaterally.  
Unilateral CSR initiatives are particularly noteworthy in countries with a capitalism 
dominated by markets and finance. Pressure from stakeholders and the need for legitimacy 
of their business models have led them to voluntarily value CSR. With the neo-liberal trend 
since the early 1980s, CSR thus took on an explicit vocation. This is linked to the decline 
of trade unionism and weak State control. Thus, CSR is emerging as a continuum of this 
new power game between the actors of the GVC. From a managerial perspective, the 
arbitration may be in terms of costs/benefits. Relative alignment with stakeholder 
expectations can be beneficial for the company’s image. 
Despite their contribution, several studies have highlighted the limitations of codes of 
conduct. According to Lakhani et al. (2013, p. 461) : 
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"The general lack of compliance with such codes has been linked to a large 
number of factors, including the capability of suppliers in meeting standards 
laid down in corporate codes as well as how those standards have been spelled 
out".  
Furthermore, despite the implicit reference to the ILO (1998) core labour standards, there 
is a lack of coordination with trade unions. A more detailed analysis by Hassel (2008) on 
codes of conduct and decent corporate behaviour shows that out of 9 code of conduct 
initiatives8, only one was sponsored by trade unions. These are the International 
Framework Agreements (IFAs). 
4.3. IFAs and transnational solidarity  
According to the theory of strategic choice and the theory of regulation, the analysis of 
industrial relations is largely embedded in national organizational and institutional 
arrangements. Indeed, According to (Hadwiger, 2015, p. 76) : 
"IFAs, concluded between multinational enterprises (MNEs) and Global 
Union federations (FUFs), bring a new dimension to global labour relations 
in response to these challenge".  
Josserand and Kaine (2016, p. 742) define as : 
"Agreements signed between international trade union federations and certain 
MNCs in order to promote the application of labour standards by the MNCs 
concerned and, often, their supply chains".  
According to Tapia et al. (2015, p. 168) : 
"While IFA and CSR might at first glance appear to be similar, IFAs are 
negotiated between MNCs and global or regional union federations rather 
than unilateral declaration by the firm. Therefore, they are considered a first 
step toward a more international form of collective bargaining".  
Thus, unlike codes of conduct, IFAs can be inscribed in a pluralistic perspective that tries 
to give space to international social dialogue and to foster a co-operative and trusting 
relationship between the different concerned actors in GVCs (Tapia et al., 2013). 
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Nevertheless, the strategic choices of the lead company may be well influenced by the 
nature of the international membership and implementation of IFAs.  
Projected with the taxonomy of Boyer (2015), we can conclude that unlike codes of 
conduct, countries with family capitalism and countries with social-democratic capitalism 
are the most likely to sign an IFA. Hadwiger’s (2015) study can support this analysis :  
Out of 54 IFAs signed, between 2009 and 2015, 43 companies have their main 
headquarters in Europe with only one American company. The top four 
countries, in terms of agreements signed, are Germany, France, Spain and 
Sweden.  
IFAs have been put forward as examples of good practice9. We can take as an example the 
content of the agreement between PSA Peugeot Citroën and IndustriALL :  
"Any failure retailing to the respect human rights shall lead to corrective 
action plans after a warning from PSA Peugeot Citroën (…) A specific 
process will also be set up for small companies of supplier and subcontractor, 
to enable them to gradually apply the previously stated ILO standards" 
(Hadwiger, 2015, p. 84). 
Beyond certain limits in terms of implementation and monitoring, IFA clauses can be 
legally binding. Anner (2015) gives the example of the IFA signed in 2013 in Bangladesh 
following the Rana-Plaza scandal. This agreement advances in content a "decent corporate 
behaviour", an explicit commitment to decent labor conditions for suppliers. Stakeholders 
(international and local trade unions, international labor NGOs, and the lead companies) 
take part in a joint regulatory role among suppliers. One indication of the success of this 
agreement is the increase in 2014 of the minimum wage by 77%. However, some MNCs 
have recently migrated to other countries in the world with low wages. Ethiopia can be one 
of the examples of countries that offer new competitive advantages (Le monde, 8 May 
2019). 
4.4. NGOs and labor rights standardisation  
The shifting of productivity frontiers between countries and the integration of other actors 
throughout GVCs has led to more participatory social and global governance. This is quite 
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remarkable with the emergence of other CSR initiatives such as social certifications. Labor 
rights NGOs support most of these initiatives. One of the main labor law certifications is 
SA 8000, which was introduced in 1998 by the American NGO Social Accountability 
International10 (SAI). According to Hassel (2008), 1,200 companies were SA 8000 
accredited in 2007. This certification is founded on the main labor standards set out by the 
ILO in 1998 (Hassel, 2008, p. 237) :  
"(1) the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining, (2) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory 
labor, (3) the effective abolition of child labor, and (4) the elimination of 
discrimination in regarding of employment and occupation". 
In terms of monitoring, the SAI requires regular reports on compliance with these standards 
(O’Rouke, 2006). With mimetic behaviour, lead companies try to integrate CSR 
instruments into their business models. However, the question of the success of these 
initiatives is controversial. Criticisms that can be levelled at CSR initiatives through NGOs 
relate to corruption, ineffective monitoring, and lack of worker participation. To confirm 
this, Brown (2015, p. 39) analyses the case of Ali Enterprise :  
"the factory received an SA 8000 certification just three weeks before an 
entirely predictable and preventable fire killed 25 per cent of the workforce, 
289 workers who were burned to death in December 2012 (…) The 
certification SAI was subcontracted out to the Italian based RINA company, 
which then subcontracted the actual factory inspection in Pakistan to the RI 
& CA company, which has certified more than 100 factories in Pakistan. 
Neither SAI nor RINA ever visited the factory".  
As a result, the negative effects of offshoring have been addressed by inadequate practices. 
The new actors accredited their roles to other intermediaries. Indeed, despite their 
contributions to the world of labor, some recent studies questioned the credibility of some 
NGOs. 
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5. Conclusion  
This article aims to show the different changes in world of labor through a critical analysis 
of CSR across GVCs. It is quite remarkable that the traditional regime of labor regulation 
founded throughout the period of integrated liberalism has been diluted with the 
internationalisation of labor and employment relations and the shifting productivity 
frontiers between countries. Recently recognized in the world of business, CSR is a social 
construction that emerged particularly from the 1980s onwards in parallel with the 
exponential growth of the neo-liberal trend. Under a new form of industrial and global 
governance, MNCs have tried to cushion the pressure of stakeholders inside and outside 
the workplace.  
We have clearly noticed that the main recent theoretical models in industrial relations are 
no longer able to respond to the new employment relationships. The deficit of State 
governance is partly filled by the commitment of new regulatory actors at national and 
international level. International trade union federations, international labor rights 
institutions as well as NGOs and other civil society organizations have become actors 
complement and sometimes substitute the traditional regulatory mechanisms. This 
conception is in line with our developed analytical framework. We have tried to 
conceptualize an interrelation between MNCs, collective actors at the nation-state level and 
international labor rights actors. The actions of all these actors have implications for the 
outcomes of the new economic and social equation. 
In empirical terms, our research is an extension of recent studies in industrial relations that 
consider CSR as a new form of regulation. Drawing on regulation theory, we have tried to 
advance a better understanding of the heterogeneity of CSR adoption between different 
institutional contexts. The internationalization of production has weakened traditional 
coercive and normative mechanisms. This has led to the emergence of decentralized 
instruments of labor regulation, often in countries with family capitalism and countries 
with social-democratic capitalism and centralized in countries with a capitalism dominated 
by markets and finance. The analysis of codes of conduct, IFAs and labor rights standard-
setting organization has confirmed our research hypothesis. 
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The different changes in business models are largely linked to the division in the classical 
self-integrated centre of the organization of labor and production into different sub-units 
dispersed within and outside the nation-state. In post-industrial societies, the function of 
production is no longer a priority. Thus, work and employment no longer have the same 
centrality as they did possess in the glorious thirty years. Competition and financialization 
have dissociated the compromise between the State and the wage labor nexus. This 
situation influences labor conditions at international suppliers with the pressure of a hyper-
competitive global production regime and its iron triangle (price, quality, and flexibility). 
It is further deteriorating with the outsourcing of labor relations from large suppliers to 
temporary employment agencies.  
In sum, from a new theoretical angle, this study allowed us to better understand the new 
business patterns of MNCs and the different ways in which GVC operates. The various 
points raised may be useful for adjusting the behaviour of MNC and better valuing their 
intangible capital. With financialization and the various mergers and acquisitions, 
oligopolistic concentration on an international scale can only result in a strengthening of 
the managerial perspective in the economic and social sphere. This new trend cast’s doubt 
on the potential of private regulation and calls into question the economic integration 
strategies pursued by governments. On the other hand, this study may be useful for further 
research. Empirical studies can make better use of the analytical framework developed. 
The evaluation of unilateral and multilateral CSR initiatives according to the home 
countries of MNC can provide further empirical support to our analytical framework. An 
analysis of the content of these initiatives can further underline the contribution of non-
traditional actors in the new industrial relations regime. 
6. Endnotes 
 
1 According to Henderson et al. (2002), these are: corporate power in terms of the ability of the company 
to influence decisions and resource allocations; institutional power in terms of the ability of government 
and international institutions to influence network relationships; and collective power in terms of the ability 
of collective action, i.e. trade unions, employers' associations and NGOs to influence network outcomes. 
2 In particular, the GVC concept is more relevant to global supply chains. The latter concept focuses on 
the input-output structure between a set of companies, suppliers, and customers. In addition, it focuses on 
the function of production rather than the provision of services (Wright and Kaine, 2015). Thus, the GVC 
concept is more appropriate for a comprehensive analysis of different transactions and different actors in 
the supply of intermediate and final products. 
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3 Gereffi et al. (2005, p. 99) are convinced that "the variables internal [complexity; codification and 
capacity] (…) influence the shape and governance of GVCs in important ways, regardless of the institutional 
context in which they are situated".   
4 According to Boyer (2015, p. 129), "each institutional form develops its own temporality". The post-war 
period was often characterized by a social-democratic compromise. This understanding is the result of a 
complementarity between the State and the the wage labor nexus. However, from the 1980s onwards, 
national economies experienced a change in the borders of competition between companies. 
5 As defined in Boyer (2015, p. 46), these are : "type of means of production; form of the social and 
technical division of labor; modality of mobilization and attachment of employees to the company; 
determinants of wage income, direct or indirect; finally, salaried lifestyle, more or less linked to the 
acquisition of goods or the use of collective services outside the market". 
6 More explicitly, according to (Boyer, 2015), "all institutional forms are affected by internationalization. 
A new stage in conceptualization is therefore necessary". 
7 According to Hassel (2008, p. 239), codes of conduct emerged following the launch of the "Sullivan 
Principles in South Africa" by American companies in 1977. These principles are being followed by others. 
The first code of conduct was launched by the American company Levi Strauss in 1991. It is the first to 
impose good practices in terms of labor conditions on suppliers. 
8 Hassel (2008) puts codes of conduct and IFAs in the same CSR basket. Nevertheless, Tapia et al. (2015) 
make a distinction in terms of multilateral and unilateral CSR initiatives.   
9 Only 20 per cent of IFAs do not refer to labor conditions at suppliers and subcontractors.   
10 The SAI Advisory Board is composed of MNCs, international trade unions and other labor rights NGOs 
(O'Rouke 2006) 
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